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• We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line.
• We introduce an approach to compute aggregate gap-minimizing assignments.
• We also extend the approach to gap-egalitarian and probabilistic assignments.
• The approach relies on an algorithm which is faster than general purpose algorithms.
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a b s t r a c t
We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line, where only one agent can be served
at a slot and each agent prefers to be served as close as possible to his target. We introduce a general
approach to compute aggregate gap-minimizing assignments, as well as gap-egalitarian assignments.
The approach relies on an algorithm which is shown to be faster than general purpose algorithms for
the assignment problem. We also extend the approach to probabilistic assignments and explore the
computational features of existing, as well as new, methods for this setting.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
An assignment problem refers to the broad situation in which a
set of objects are to be allocated among a group of agents, and each
agent is to receive exactly one object. The interest on problems
of this sort, which abound in real life, ranges from ancient writ-
ings to modern scientific research in different fields (Hylland and
Zeckhauser, 1979; Hofstee, 1990; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Burkhard et al., 2009).
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0165-4896/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.In a recent paper, Hougaard et al. (2014) introduce and analyze
a specific assignment problem, known as the problem of assigning
agents to a line. In such a problem, each agent has a preferred slot
(target) and wants to be served as close as possible to it. Each
slot can serve only one agent. The number of slots is at least the
number of agents but can be arbitrarily larger than the number of
agents.
Hougaard et al. (2014) focus on the notion of (aggregate) gap
minimization for such a problem, i.e., minimizing the sum of the
distances. More precisely, they provide a direct method for testing
if a given deterministic assignment is aggregate gap-minimizing,
and make use of it to propose an aggregate gap-minimizing modi-
fication of the classic random prioritymethod to solve this class of
problems. It is shown that aggregate gap minimization is incom-
patible with sd-no-envy and sd-strategy-proofness. Moreover, it is
shown that the results extend to more general preference struc-
tures. However, the computational aspects of suchmethods are yet
to be explored, and we aim to do so in this paper. Nevertheless,
the aims of this paper, which we enumerate next, will go beyond
94 H. Aziz et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 90 (2017) 93–99studying the computational aspects of the methods developed in
Hougaard et al. (2014).
First, we are concerned with the more general problem of
identifying (rather than just testing) aggregate gap-minimizing as-
signments. We introduce an algorithm, dubbed as the Neat Shift-
ing Algorithm, to compute aggregate gap-minimizing assignments,
which is shown to be faster than general purpose algorithms for
the assignment problem. The algorithm relies on the concept of
neatness, which refers to target-ordered assignments in which all
agents with the same target are placed next to each other.
Second, we are also concerned with identifying gap-egalitarian
assignments, i.e., assignments lexicographically minimizing the
distribution of gaps.1 We show that gap-egalitarian and aggregate
gap-minimizing assignments may not coincide; in particular, a
gap-egalitarian assignment may not be aggregate gap-minimizing
and an aggregate gap-minimizing assignment may not be gap-
egalitarian. We also show that, whereas neatness is a necessary
condition for gap-egalitarian assignments, there always exists
at least one aggregate gap-minimizing assignment that is neat.
Furthermore, we show that a suitable adaptation of the Neat
Shifting Algorithm can be used to yield gap-egalitarian assignments.
Third, when focusing on probabilistic assignments, which arise
when randomizing among outcomes, we present new methods,
each having their own merits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss some related literature to this paper. In Section 3, we
introduce the model and preliminary concepts. In Section 4, we
focus on aggregate gap-minimizing assignments and introduce the
Neat Shifting Algorithm. In Section 5, we extend the analysis to
probabilistic assignments and present aggregate gap-minimizing
modifications of the canonical random priority solution. In
Section 6, we focus on gap-egalitarian assignments. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Asmentioned above, the closest work to this paper is Hougaard
et al. (2014) in which the problem of assigning agents to a line
is considered. Therein, a direct method for testing if a given
deterministic assignment is aggregate gap-minimizing is provided.
Chun and Park (forthcoming) consider the samemodel but assume
cardinal (and not just ordinal) preferences. More precisely, they
assume that each agent’s utility is equal to the amount ofmonetary
transfer minus the distance from the target to his assigned slot.
They look at aggregate gap-minimizing as well as gap-egalitarian
assignments. They obtain some characterizations but, in contrast
to Hougaard et al. (2014), they assume that the number of slots
is equal to the number of agents, which greatly simplifies the
structure of the assignments as well as the complexity of the
problem.2
In related work, Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) consider a
similar problem in the context of ‘facility location’ and pursue
the goals of minimizing the aggregate gap, as well as minimizing
the maximum gap. Instead of considering optimal solutions,
the focus is on strategy-proof mechanisms that provide good
approximations of the optimal solutions.
The problem of assigning agents to a line is a slightly different
version of the model introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001), which could be considered as one of the most influential
1 More precisely, we consider first assignments in which the largest gap is as
small as possible. Among those, we consider the assignments in which the second
largest gap is as small as possible, etc.
2 The computational aspects of the methods introduced in those papers are not
considered therein.papers on assignment problems within the economic literature.
We not only allow for weak preferences, as Katta and Sethuraman
(2006), but we actually assume that preferences are single-peaked,
as Kasajima (2013) does, and symmetric (to both sides of the peak).
Assignment problems have long been analyzed within the eco-
nomics literature, mostly focusing on issues of efficiency, incen-
tive compatibility and fairness. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)
proposed an algorithm, based on market-clearing prices, for al-
locating individuals to positions with limited capacities. The al-
gorithm guarantees (ex-ante) efficiency, and envy-freeness, but
fails to be strategy-proof. As a matter of fact, Zhou (1990) showed
that no solution in such a setting satisfies strategy-proofness,
(ex-ante) efficiency, and a notion of fairness weaker than envy-
freeness. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) restricted attention to
strict preferences and ordinal solutions and introduced the no-
tion of sd-efficiency, which states that a probabilistic assignment
is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual pref-
erences over certain objects. They characterized all sd-efficient
assignments and showed that sd-efficiency is incompatible with
sd-strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals.3 They also
showed that, for more than three agents, no solution satisfies
sd-envy-freeness and sd-strategy-proofness together, along with
equal treatment of equals.
Previous papers in the economics literature have largely ig-
nored computational aspects. The literature on operations re-
search, computer science and artificial intelligence, on the other
hand, has covered various computational aspects of assignment
problems (Burkhard et al., 2009; Bouveret et al., 2016; Nguyen
et al., 2014; Lang and Rothe, 2015). When the number of items
to be allocated to the agents is equal to the number of agents,
standard maximum weight matching algorithms can be used to
compute allocations that maximize total welfare. For maximizing
egalitarian welfare, a perfect matching algorithm can be used to
compute a maximum egalitarian assignment. However, the prob-
lem of maximizing egalitarian welfare is NP-complete if the num-
ber of items is more than the number of agents and agents can
get multiple items (Demko and Hill, 1988). Aziz et al. (2016)
proved that testing Pareto optimality is coNP-complete under ad-
ditive preferences even if each agent is to be allocated two items.
Aziz et al. (2013) presented a general algorithm to compute and
test Pareto optimal outcomes in discrete allocation and coali-
tion formation settings with ordinal preferences. More recently,
Damamme et al. (2015) investigated the power of dynamics based
on rational bilateral deals (swaps) in various settings including
ours. Among other things, they prove NP-hardness of deciding
whether a utilitarian or egalitarian allocation is reachable. Now,
as they acknowledge, our model of assigning agents to slots on a
line induces, by default, a more restrictive domain, as the notion of
distance is symmetric.
3. Preliminaries
We consider the model introduced by Hougaard et al. (2014).
Imagine a facility with a fixed service capacity that can serve
one agent at each (equidistant) slot. Agents are labeled by letters,
A, B, . . . with generic elements i and j. The number of slots is
infinite and identified with the integer numbers. Each agent i has
a preferred slot ti which we refer to as the agent’s target. We label
the agents so that tA ≤ tB ≤ · · ·. A problem of assigning agents to a
line (in short, a problem), consists of a set of agents and the list of
their corresponding targets (i.e., slots at which they would like to
be served).
3 Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) provided an alternative characterization of
sd-efficiency.
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cally, as in Example 1. Note that the input to the problem is linear
in the number of agents.
Example 1. [{A, B, C,D, E} : 5; {F ,G} : 7]. Five agents wish to be
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An allocation (of a problem) is a deterministic assignment of
agents to slots. Denote by xi the slot assigned to agent i in allocation
x.We shall often refer to xi as agent i’s outcome (in allocation x). For
any allocation x and any twodistinct agentsA, B, itmust be the case
that xA ≠ xB. For each allocation x we define the gap of agent i as
gi(x) = |ti − xi|.
An allocation is (aggregate) gap-minimizing if it minimizes the
aggregate gap of the agents.
For each assignment P , we denote by v(P) the vector of
individual gaps in decreasing order. We refer to v(P) as the
signature vector of P . We say that an assignment is gap-egalitarian
if it has the lexicographically minimum signature vector. Formally,
given α,β ∈ Rn satisfying α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αn, β1 ≥ β2 ≥
· · · ≥ βn, we say that α lexicographically dominates β if there exists
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that αi = βi, for each i = 1, . . . , k− 1, and
αk < βk. In words, the k−1 largest coordinates of α and β coincide
and the kth largest coordinate of α is smaller than that of β .4 Then,
an assignment P is gap-egalitarian if its signature vector v(P) is
not lexicographically dominated by the signature vector v(Q ), of any
other assignment Q .
The next figures provide instances of aggregate gap-minimizing
and gap-egalitarian allocations for the problem in Example 1.
Example 1 (cont’d):
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(b) Allocation y is gap-egalitarian :
y ∈ arg lexmin{gi(z) : i = A, B, C, . . .}
4 For k = 1, we simply say that the largest coordinate of α is smaller than the
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4. Aggregate gap-minimizing assignments
Hougaard et al. (2014) provided an algorithm to test whether
an assignment is (aggregate) gap-minimizing. Building onto
it, we now propose a new algorithm to actually determine
(aggregate) gap-minimizing assignments. The precise definition
of the algorithm, which we call the Neat Shifting Algorithm, is
introduced below.
We first present some notation and preliminary results that are
necessary to understand the definition, aswell as themain features
of the algorithm.
For eachproblem, agents can bepartitioned into types according
to their targets. Formally, for each target k, let Nk denote the
set of agents sharing such a target k. Then, N = k Nk. Each
assignment in which agents from the same type Nk are placed
contiguously can be represented compactly by stating the leftmost
slot ℓ(Nk) and the rightmost slot r(Nk) of the type. Each assignment
inwhich all agents of the same type are located contiguously can be
represented in the type form. We say that an assignment is target-
ordered if it is not the case that there exist two agents i and jwhere
i is located to the left of j but ti is to the right of tj. We say that
an assignment is contiguous if all agents with the same target are
placed next to each other. Finally, we say that an assignment is
neat if it is both target-ordered and contiguous. Then, we have the
following:
Lemma 1. There always exists a target-ordered aggregate gap mini-
mizing assignment. Moreover, such an assignment is contiguous. Thus,
there always exists a neat aggregate gap-minimizing assignment.
Proof. Assume there is an aggregate gap minimizing assignment
in which an agent i is located to the left of another agent j, but ti
is to the right of tj. If so, swapping the agents cannot increase the
aggregate gap. Now, assume there is a target-ordered aggregate
gap minimizing assignment that is not contiguous. This means
that there exist agents of at least one type that have empty slots
between them. Now, the target of these agents can either bewithin
the gap, to the left of the gap or to right of the gap. In all three
cases, the aggregate gap can be decreased by moving agents one
slot towards the gap. 
The Neat Shifting Algorithm yields aggregate gap-minimizing
assignments by considering neat assignments. The basic idea of the
algorithm is that types are first to be placed exactly at, and then
around, the target. In case these slots are already taken, the subset
of agents is placed as close to the target as possible in the available
slots to the right. The new type is pushed towards the target, which
leads to agents in the way being shifted as well. If such a shift does
not increase the aggregate gap, then it is implemented and shifts
are repeated.
The next lemma shows that assignments represented in type
form can be computed in linear time on the number of agents.
Lemma 2. For any assignment represented in its type form, its gap
can be computed in time O(n).
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Input: Agent set N = {1, . . . , n} with target ti for each i ∈ N ,
and goalGwhich is the optimality criteria that is either aggregate
gap-minimization or egalitarian gap-minimization.
Output: Allocation.
1: Partition N into sets N1, . . . ,Nk′ where the target of agents in
Ni is ti and ti < tj for i < j. In the solution computed, all agents
in Ni will be to the left of all agents in Nj for i < j.
2: Initialize k = 0.
3: while k < k′ do
4: Set ℓ(Nk+1) to max(r(Nk) + 1, tk+1 − ⌊nk+1/2⌋) and set
r(Nk+1) to ℓ(Nk+1)+ nk+1 − 1.
5: if ℓ(Nk+1) = tk+1 − ⌊nk+1/2⌋ then
6: Nk+1 was placed in the optimal position without compro-
mising previous sets of agents.
7: else if ℓ(Nk+1) > tk+1 − ⌊nk+1/2⌋ then
8: Set leftplace to true
9: while leftplace do
10: Set ℓ′ to ℓ and r ′ to r values.
11: set r ′(Nk+1) to r ′(Nk+1)−1 and ℓ′(Nk+1) to ℓ′(Nk+1)−1.
12: Set j′ to k+ 1.
13: while (ℓ′(Nj′) = r(Nj′−1)) do
14: set r ′(Nj′−1) to r ′(Nj′−1)−1 and ℓ′(Nj′−1) to ℓ′(Nj′−1)−
1.
15: decrease j′ by one.
16: end while
17: if G wrt ℓ′ and r ′ values is same as wrt ℓ and r values
then
18: Set ℓ and r values to ℓ′ and r ′ values
19: else






Proof. We initialize the gap G to zero. We can simply go through
all the agents and for each agent, we add the difference between
the agent’s position and the agent’s target slot number to G. 
Wesay that a neat aggregate gap-minimizing assignment is left-
respecting if there does not exist a different neat aggregate gap-
minimizing assignment for which all types’ segments are moved
to the left, or stay fixed.5
Lemma 3. There exists a unique (subject to intra-type swapping) left-
respecting aggregate gap-minimizing assignment.
Proof. For a given problem, let A denote the set of its neat
aggregate gap minimizing assignments. For each assignment x, let
ℓ(Nk, x) be the leftmost slot occupied by an agent in type Nk. We
claim that there exists y ∈ A such that, for each Nk, ℓ(Nk, y) =
minx∈A ℓ(Nk, x). Let i = 1, . . . , k′ be an index on types where 1
is the type with target furthest to the left and k′ is the type with
target furthest to the right. We proceed by induction on types.
Type 1. Obviously, there exists an assignment y ∈ A where
ℓ(N1, y) = minx∈A ℓ(N1, x).
Induction hypothesis. Assume there exists an assignment y ∈ A
where ℓ(Nk, y) = minx∈A ℓ(Nk, x), for i = 1, . . . , k.
5 When we consider neat assignments, we are only concerned with the positions
of the agent types and do not distinguish between assignmentswhere agentswithin
the same type swap positions.Type k + 1. Assume, by contradiction, that ℓ(Nk+1, y) ≠
minx∈A ℓ(Nk+1, x). Then, there exists an assignment z ∈ A where
ℓ(Nk+1, z) = minx∈A ℓ(Nk+1, x). Now, define the assignment w
such that it is identical to y for types 1, . . . , k and identical to z for
types k+1, . . . , k′.We claim thatw ∈ A. Assume, by contradiction,
that this is not the case. Then, going fromw to ywould reduce the
aggregate gap, hence contradicting that z ∈ A. 
Theorem 1. The Neat Shifting Algorithm yields aggregate gap-
minimizing assignments.
Proof. We need to prove that the assignment returned by the
algorithm minimizes the aggregate gap. First of all, note that the
assignment produced by the algorithm is neat.
In the first iteration, the algorithm produces a left-respecting
neat gap-minimizing assignment for N1. Suppose this is the case
for iterations 1, . . . , k. Now, consider the result of iteration k +
1, which we aim to show is left-respecting and aggregate gap-
minimizing. Indeed, we first try to place the block ofNk+1 of agents
around tk. If we are able to do so, then we have computed the
left optimal aggregate gap-minimizing assignment, as the gap is
additive. In case Nk+1 cannot be accommodated exactly around tk,
then thismeans thatNk+1 is placed adjacent to the rightmost agent
in Nk. We then move Nk+1 one slot leftwards with as many agents
moved one slot to the left as to accommodate Nk+1. Note that, as
the assignment for N1, . . . ,Nk was left optimal, this move only
increases the aggregate gap for agents in N1, . . . ,Nk but decreases
the aggregate gap for agents in Nk+1. If such a move does not
increase the aggregate gap of agents N1, . . . ,Nk+1, we allow for
such a move. We repeat these moves, until Nk+1 cannot be shifted
leftwards without increasing the aggregate gap of all the agents in
N1, . . . ,Nk+1. Thus, if the assignment in iteration k+1 is aggregate
gap minimizing then it is left-respecting. It remains to be shown
that the assignment in iteration k+1 is aggregate gap-minimizing.
Let j be the smallest number such that Nj are placed contiguously
to Nk+1. Observe that if the assignment in iteration k + 1 is not
aggregate gap minimizing then there exists another aggregate gap
minimizing (and left-respecting) assignment for which the block
Nj ∪ · · · ∪ Nk+1 is separated by at least one empty slot. However,
the assignment to the left of such an empty slot is identical to the
one in iteration k, contradicting that the algorithm produced the
outcome in iteration k+ 1. 
The next result states the speed of the above algorithm.
Theorem 2. The Neat Shifting Algorithm runs in O(n3) time.
Proof. In each iteration of the outer while loop, one type is
handled. There can be at most O(n) iterations of this while loop.
Then agents may need to be moved leftwards in the second while
loop. Agents within the new type Nk+1, can be at most O(n) away
from their target because of the agents already allocated to slots.
The type Nk+1 has to move at most O(n) to the left, as well as other
agents that need to yield room for classNk+1. Therefore, the second
while loop runs at most O(n) times. After each leftward shift, we
check whether the new gap is more than previous gap which takes
O(n). Hence, the overall algorithm takes O(n3) time. 
A standard combinatorial optimization approach would allow
to compute an aggregate gap-minimizing assignment by a
reduction to a maximum weight matching in which each vertex
(i, s) represents an agent-slot pair and each edge is |ti− s|. Such an
algorithm takes O(n3) time, only if the number of slots is O(n). The
overall running time can be much worse as we do not impose any
assumption on the number of slots.
The Neat Shifting Algorithm presented above thus yields a
tailor-made algorithm that is faster than general algorithms for our
(line) setting where there can be many more available slots than
the number of agents.
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Deterministic assignment is usually criticized on equity grounds.
The alternative is to deal with probabilistic assignment, which
arises when randomizing over deterministic allocations. Formally,
a probabilistic assignment is a specification of marginal probabil-
ities for each agent over slots. For a given problem, a lottery is
a probability distribution over deterministic allocations. We en-
dorse the approach in the seminal contribution of Bogomolnaia
and Moulin (2001) and assume that each agent cares only about
his marginal distribution over outcomes (gaps, in our framework).
A probabilistic assignment is (aggregate) gap-minimizing if there
exists a lottery, target-ordered with it, such that each allocation in
its support is (aggregate) gap-minimizing.
A solution is a mapping from problems to probabilistic
assignments. We say that a solution satisfies a property if each
probabilistic assignment it gives rise to satisfies that property. We
impose from the outset that solutions satisfy the following three
basic fairness requirements: Equal treatment of equals, which says
that agents with the same target should get the same probability
distribution over slots; Slot invariance, meaning that the solution
does not depend on the labeling of slots; and Symmetry, which says
that if we ‘‘flip’’ the problem from left to right, the corresponding
solution flips too.
The so-called random priority (RP), which assigns objects based
on a randomordering of the agents is a focal solution. It is, however,
in conflict with efficiency (and, in the case of our setting, evenwith
weak forms of it).
Hougaard et al. (2014) propose what they dubbed Modified RP,
which is not only sd-efficient but also aggregate gap-minimizing.
The modification behaves as RP by ordering agents randomly
and then assigning them to slots sequentially, but with the
important modification of doing so in a way that will ensure that
the allocation following each iteration in the algorithm will be
aggregate gap-minimizing, among those agents already assigned.
For the sake of completeness we present the definition of
Modified RP as presented by Hougaard et al. (2014).
Modified RP: Order agents randomly. Assign the first agent his
target. Assign the second agent a most preferred free slot; if there
are two such slots pick one of them with equal probability, . . . .
Suppose that k − 1 agents have been assigned, and consider now
the next agent (k) in the order. If his target is free, assign him the
target and go to the next agent. If his target is not free, we consider
two allocations constructed as follows:
(a) Assign k to the slot furthest to the right that is occupied by
some agent iwith target to the left of k and who is assigned to
an outcome to the right of his own target (if no such outcome
exists, assign k to the first free slot to the left of his target, and
go to (b)). Assign agent i to the slot furthest to the right that is
occupied by some agent j with target to the left of i, and who
is assigned to an outcome to the right of his own target (if no
suchoutcomeexists, assign j to the first free slot to the left of his
target, and go to (b)), etc. until some agent has been assigned
the first free slot to the left.
(b) Make the symmetric counterpart construction involving agents
having target to the right of k’s target, which stops when an
agent has been assigned the first free slot to the right of k’s tar-
get.
As noted in Hougaard et al. (2014), it is clear from the
construction of the modified RP algorithm that the solution it
induces satisfies the three basic fairness requirements imposed
from the outset: equal treatment of equals, slot invariance, and
symmetry.
The next result shows Modified RP’s computational speed.Theorem 3. Modified RP runs in O(n3) time.
Proof. There are n iterations in which a new agent is allocated a
slot and previous agentsmay be reallocated. The newagent khas to
scan at most O(n) slots from his target to either find an empty slot
or replace an agent. Each replaced agent then has to scan slotsO(n)
to the left of his current position to find an empty slot or replace
an agent. In theworst case, there can beO(n) replacements. Hence,
the overall running time is O(n3). 
The statement above shows that Modified RP is faster than
using general maximum weight matching algorithms even when
the number of slots is O(n). Modified RP and the Neat Shifting
algorithm have the same running time. However, the advantage
of the Neat Shifting algorithm is that it can be easily modified to
return gap-egalitarian assignments.Wewill present this idea in the
next section.
Similar toModifiedRP,we can adapt theNeat Shifting algorithm
to obtain a randomized algorithm that satisfies symmetry.We start
with a deterministic aggregate gap-minimizing assignment. With
probability 1/2, we get such an assignment exactly as described
in the mentioned algorithm. In order to ensure flip invariance, we
also consider, with probability 1/2, the assignment derived from
the algorithm replacing its convention, to consider right instead of
left.6 Once we have the deterministic (initial) assignment, we re-
assign slots uniformly at random among clones in eachNi. The next
statement follows directly from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. The Probabilistic Neat Shifting Algorithm runs in O(n3)
time.
There is another natural way to extend RP to our setting so that
the extension is also aggregate gap-minimizing. More precisely,
take a permutation π of agents uniformly at random. For each
π(i), check (using amaximumweight perfectmatching algorithm)
whetherπ(i) canbe given amost preferred slotwhile ensuring that
there exists an aggregate gap-minimizing assignment in which
each agent before π(i) in the permutation gets his utility level. If
not, then π(i) tries for the next most preferred slots until there
exists an aggregate gap-minimizing assignment in which each
agent before π(i) in the permutation gets his utility level. The
process is repeated until all agents in the permutation are dealt
with. Then, an allocation can be computed by suitably computing
a maximum weight perfect matching. Such an algorithm requires
using a reduction to a maximum weight matching. The algorithm
takes O(n5) time even if the number of slots is O(n). Note however
that the extension of RP described above is not restricted to the line
assignment setting. It yields a (probabilistic) welfare maximizing
solution, which captures RP in the sense that subsequent agents
cannot change the utility level of a previous agent.
6. Egalitarian assignments
We now focus on egalitarian rather than aggregate gap-
minimizing assignments. More precisely, we have concentrated
so far on making the aggregate gap of an assignment as small as
possible. Now, we concentrate on assignments whose maximum
gaps are as small as possible (and, among them, on assignments
whose second largest gaps are as small as possible, etc.).
As shown with Example 1, and the allocations x and y depicted
afterwards, a gap-egalitarian assignment may not be (aggregate)
gap-minimizing and vice versa. More precisely, for the problem
6 More precisely, replace ‘‘left’’ by ‘‘right’’ in the sentence ‘‘In the solution
computed all agents in Ni will be on the left of all agents in Nj for i < j’’ at the
beginning of the description of the algorithm.
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wish to be located at slot 7, consider two allocations. In allocation
y, two of the first 5 agents and one of the 2 last agents are
assigned to a slot at a distance 2 of their respective targets, whereas
two of the remaining first 5 agents, and the remaining agent of
the last 2 are assigned to a slot at a distance 1 of their targets.
This implies that the maximum gap is 2 and, as a result, y is a
gap-egalitarian assignment. In allocation x, the entire contiguous
segment is moved one slot to the left, which makes the aggregate
gap reduce from 9 to 8 (but at the cost of making one agent face a
gap of 3). Thus, gap egalitarianism does not imply aggregate gap
minimization and, conversely, aggregate gap minimization does
not imply gap egalitarianism.7
We then explore features of gap-egalitarian assignments.
Previously, we showed that there always exists an aggregate gap-
minimizing assignment that is neat.We show now that neatness is
a necessary condition for gap-egalitarian assignments.
Lemma 4. Each gap-egalitarian assignment is neat.
Proof. We first note that if a gap-egalitarian assignment is target-
ordered then it is contiguous. Assume otherwise. Then, there exist
agents of at least one type that have empty slots between them.
Now, the target is either on the gap, to the left of the gap, or to right
of the gap. In all three cases, themaximal gap and the lexicographic
vector can be decreased bymoving agents one slot towards the gap.
Next, suppose there exists a gap-egalitarian assignment that is
not target-ordered, i.e., there exist two agents where i is located to
the left of j but ti is to the right of tj. We claim that the lexicographic
vector decreases when swapping the agents. Indeed, let x be the
original assignment and x′ be the assignment after i and j swap
slots. If i and j are both assigned slots at or in between their
target, they both benefit from a swap, contradicting that x is gap-
egalitarian. If i and j are both assigned to a slot on the opposite side
of the other agent’s target, a swap will reduce the largest gap for
these two agents, contradicting that x is gap-egalitarian. Similarly,
if both agents are located on the right of j’s target, or if both agents
are located on the left of i’s target, a swap will reduce the largest
gap for these two agents, and we are done. It remains to consider
the cases where one agent is located at, or in between, the two
targets, and the other agent is located outside this area. Without
loss of generality, let i be located to the right of j’s target and j be
located at, or in between, i and j’s targets. Then, switching slots,
i would reduce the gap (i.e., gi(x′) < gi(x)). Furthermore, j may
increase his gap but it would still be smaller than i’s original gap
(i.e., gj(x′) < gi(x)). Thus, a contradictionwith the fact that x is gap-
egalitarian. The remaining case is symmetric. We conclude that
every gap-egalitarian assignment must be neat. 
Lemma 5. There exists a unique (subject to intra-type swapping) left-
respecting gap-egalitarian assignment.
Proof. For a given problem, let A denote the set of its neat gap-
egalitarian assignments. For each assignment x, let ℓ(Nk, x) be the
leftmost slot occupied by an agent in type Nk. We claim that there
exists y ∈ A such that, for each Nk, ℓ(Nk, y) = minx∈A ℓ(Nk, x).
Let i = 1, . . . , k′ be an index on types where 1 is the type with
target furthest to the left and k′ is the type with target furthest to
the right. We proceed by induction on types.
Type 1. Obviously, there exists an assignment y ∈ A where
ℓ(N1, y) = minx∈A ℓ(N1, x).
Induction hypothesis. Assume there exists an assignment y ∈ A
where ℓ(Nk, y) = minx∈A ℓ(Nk, x), for i = 1, . . . , k.
7 Note that, in this example, one cannot find a solution that is both aggregate-gap
minimizing and gap-egalitarian.Type k + 1. Assume, by contradiction, that ℓ(Nk+1, y) ≠
minx∈A ℓ(Nk+1, x). Then, there exists an assignment z ∈ A where
ℓ(Nk+1, z) = minx∈A ℓ(Nk+1, x). Now, define the assignment w
such that it is identical to y for types 1, . . . , k and identical to z for
types k+1, . . . , k′.We claim thatw ∈ A. Assume, by contradiction,
that this is not the case. Then, going fromw to ywould give a more
egalitarian outcome, hence contradicting that z ∈ A. 
We show in the following result that the Neat Shifting
Algorithm, with the target goal of gap-egalitarianism, returns a
gap-egalitarian assignment.
Theorem 5. The Neat Shifting Algorithm with goal gap-egalitarian
yields a gap-egalitarian assignment.
Proof. By Lemma 5, there exists a unique left-respecting gap-
egalitarian assignment. We need to prove that this is the
assignment returned by the algorithm. Note that the assignment
produced by the algorithm is neat and each agent class is at most
n slots away from its target. If an agent’s class is not placed exactly
around its target, it is because the class is forced to shift and make
space to accommodate a latter class of agents with a target that
is near enough. The only reason the assignment may not be gap-
egalitarian is if the contiguous blocks of agents are not placed
optimally. We prove by induction that assignments produced by
theNeat ShiftingAlgorithmare left-respecting and gap-egalitarian.
First note that, in iteration 1, the algorithm produces a left-
respecting neat gap-egalitarian assignment. Suppose this is the
case for iterations 1, . . . , k. Now, we aim to show that the outcome
of iteration k + 1 is left-respecting and gap-egalitarian. Indeed,
we first try to place the block of Nk+1 of agents around tk. If we
are able to do so, then we have computed the left-respecting gap-
egalitarian assignment. If Nk+1 cannot be accommodated exactly
around tk, then this means that Nk+1 is placed adjacent to the
right most agent in Nk. We then move Nk+1 one slot leftwards,
with as many agents moved one slot to the left as necessary to
accommodate Nk+1. Note that since the assignment for N1, . . . ,Nk
was left-respecting, this move only increases the gap-egalitarian
goal for agents in N1, . . . ,Nk, but decreases the gap-egalitarian
goal for agents in Nk+1. If such a move decreases, or at least does
not increase the gap-egalitarian goal of agents N1, . . . ,Nk+1, we
allow for such a move. We repeat these moves, until Nk+1 cannot
be shifted leftwards without increasing the gap-egalitarian goal of
all the agents in N1, . . . ,Nk+1. Thus, if the assignment in iteration
k + 1 is gap-egalitarian then it is left-respecting. It remains to be
shown that the assignment in iteration k+1 is gap-egalitarian. Let j
be the smallest number such thatNj toNk+1 is placed contiguously.
Observe that if the assignment in iteration k + 1 is not gap-
egalitarian then there exists another gap-egalitarian (and left-
respecting) assignment for which the block Nj ∪ · · · ∪ Nk+1 is
separated by at least one empty slot. However, the assignment to
the left of such an empty slot is identical to the one in iteration k
contradicting that the algorithmproduced the outcome in iteration
k+ 1. 
The only difference between the Neat Shifting Algorithm for
aggregate gap minimization and gap egalitarianism is that, when
shifting the latest agent type set leftwards, the ℓ and r values
updates depend on whether the aggregate gap remains the same,
or whether the lexicographic signature remains the same. Since
the lexicographic signatures of two allocations can be compared
in n log n time, it follows that the Neat Shifting Algorithm for
egalitarian gap minimization takes time O(n3 log n).
As with the aggregate gap minimizing algorithm, it is of
course possible to start from the right instead of the left, and
in this way an alternative gap-egalitarian allocation can be
obtained. Given a deterministic gap-egalitarian allocation, it is
possible to construct, from these two gap-egalitarian allocations, a
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slot invariance, and symmetry, by an appropriate randomization
over these two allocations and slots associated with each target.
However, such a probabilistic assignment fails to be a gap-
egalitarian allocation of the agents’ expected gaps. Example 2
illustrates this.
Example 2. [{A, B, C} : 3; {D} : 4].
Consider the problem [{A, B, C} : 3; {D} : 4]. In this case, both
the left-oriented and right-oriented versions of the gap-egalitarian
allocation algorithm will give agent D gap 1. However, the gap-
egalitarian allocation of expected gaps will give each agent an
expected gap of 3/4. This could be obtained for example in the
following way: give D his target (i.e., slot 4) with probability 1/4
and otherwise give him slot 5. When he gets his target slot, the
other agents randomize over slots 2, 3, and 5. When agent D gets
slot 5, the remaining agents randomize over slots 2, 3, and 4. The
expected gap of A, B, and C is ( 34 )(
1
3 )(2) + ( 34 )( 13 )(2) = 3/4.
Note also that the gap-egalitarian (probabilistic) allocation does






· · · 1 2 3 4 5 6 · · ·
| | | | | | | | | |
A gap-egalitarian allocation of expected gaps can be computed
by setting up a series of linear programs. In the first linear
program, a fractional (probabilistic assignment) is computed in
which themaximumexpected gap isminimized. In the subsequent
linear programs, the next worst expected gap is minimized
while maintaining the tight constraints from the previous linear
programs (Garg et al., 2010).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of assigning
agents to a line, originally introduced by Hougaard et al. (2014).
We have introduced a new algorithm to determine aggregate gap-
minimizing assignments for such a problem and have studied
its computational speed. The algorithm represents an advance
with respect to the original algorithm by Hougaard et al. (2014),which determined whether an assignment was aggregate gap-
minimizing or not.
We have also presented a counterpart algorithm to the previous
one to determine gap-egalitarian (rather than aggregate gap-
minimizing) assignments for such a problem.
Our analysis has also been extended from deterministic
assignments to probabilistic assignment. In the latter scenario, we
have considered newmethods, as well as existing modifications of
the focal random priority method to guarantee gap minimization.
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